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Move "best practices" section down, write a minimal text
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@ -223,14 +223,6 @@ In addition to key management, a keystore often involves various supplementary f
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- **User interaction alerts**: Keystores might also need to prompt users for necessary interactions during certain operations. For example, OpenPGP cards may require user touch confirmation to authorize each cryptographic action.
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### TSKs: Best practices S2K + S2K migration?
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```{admonition} TODO
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:class: warning
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write
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```
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### Understanding key overwriting (KO) attacks
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#### What they are
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@ -249,4 +241,19 @@ Note that while S2K usage mode 253 (AEAD) has been introduced in the OpenPGP ver
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#### Resources
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For comprehensive information on KO attacks, including background, attack vectors, countermeasures, and technical analyses, visit [KOpenPGP.com](https://www.kopenpgp.com/). It is based on the paper "Victory by KO: Attacking OpenPGP Using Key Overwriting" written by Lara Bruseghini, Daniel Huigens, and Kenneth G. Paterson for the Proceedings of ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Los Angeles, November 2022.
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For comprehensive information on KO attacks, including background, attack vectors, countermeasures, and technical analyses, visit [KOpenPGP.com](https://www.kopenpgp.com/). It is based on the paper "Victory by KO: Attacking OpenPGP Using Key Overwriting" written by Lara Bruseghini, Daniel Huigens, and Kenneth G. Paterson for the Proceedings of ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Los Angeles, November 2022.
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(s2k_best_practice)=
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### TSKs: Best practices S2K + S2K migration?
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The RFC [recommends](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-10.html#name-avoiding-ciphertext-malleab) that: "Users should migrate to AEAD with all due speed."
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In the context of this chapter, this means that encrypted private keys should be upgraded by the user's OpenPGP software to use S2K usage mode 253 (AEAD) to encrypt the user's private key material.
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Note that S2K usage mode 253 (AEAD) can be applied to both version 6 and version 4 private keys, with sufficiently up-to-date OpenPGP software. This S2K usage mode is strongly recommended for all private keys.
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```{admonition} TODO
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:class: warning
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Can we make more specific recommendations, e.g. on how to do that?
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```
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