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edit ch7 signatures over data
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@ -6,15 +6,14 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: CC-BY-SA-4.0
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# Signatures over data
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# Signatures over data
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A *data signature* guarantees the authenticity (and implicitly also the integrity) of some data. Typical use cases for data signatures in OpenPGP are signatures for software packages or emails.
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In OpenPGP, a *data signature* guarantees the authenticity and, implicitly, the integrity of certain data. Typical use cases include the authentication of software packages and emails.
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When we say "authenticity," here, we mean that the signature guarantees that whoever controls the signing key material has issued the signature.
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"Authenticity" in this context means that the data signature was issued by the entity controlling the signing key material. However,
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it does not automatically signal if the expected party indeed controls the signer certificate. OpenPGP does offer mechanisms for *strong authentication*, connecting certificates to specific identities. This verifies that the intended communication partner is indeed associated with the cryptographic identity behind the signature[^sign-auth].
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It is a separate question if the party we expect indeed controls the signer certificate. OpenPGP does offer mechanisms for *strong authentication* of the connection between certificates and identities. So, if necessary, we can also verify that our intended communication partner really uses the cryptographic identity that issued the signature[^sign-auth].
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[^sign-auth]: Other signing solutions, like [signify](https://flak.tedunangst.com/post/signify), focus on pure signing without strong authentication of the signer's identity.
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[^sign-auth]: Other signing solutions, such as [signify](https://flak.tedunangst.com/post/signify), typically only offer a solution for pure signing, without offering a mechanism for strong authentication of the identity of the signer.
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Data signatures can only be issued by component keys with the *signing* [key flag](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-key-flags).
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Data signatures can only be issued by component keys that carry the *signing* [key flag](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-key-flags).
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Note that signatures over data are distinct from {ref}`component_signatures_chapter`, which are used to attach metadata or subkeys to a certificate.
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Note that signatures over data are distinct from {ref}`component_signatures_chapter`, which are used to attach metadata or subkeys to a certificate.
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