Fix instance of expiration date subpacket in chapter 6

Signed-off-by: David Runge <dave@sleepmap.de>
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David Runge 2023-12-09 10:08:49 +01:00
parent f49fb59abc
commit b4b6d04b36
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GPG key ID: 90D4B9641E092971
2 changed files with 6 additions and 4 deletions

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@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ In the OpenPGP protocol, each {term}`signature subpacket<OpenPGP Signature Subpa
This mechanism accounts for different {term}`OpenPGP implementations<OpenPGP Implementation>` that may support only certain subsets of the standard. Moreover, it anticipates the evolution of the standard, including the addition of new {term}`subpacket types<OpenPGP Signature Subpacket Type>`.
Consider a scenario where an {term}`implementation<OpenPGP Implementation>` does not recognize a {term}`subpacket<OpenPGP Signature Subpacket>` indicating {term}`signature<OpenPGP Signature Packet>` {term}`expiration`. Without understanding this concept, the {term}`implementation<OpenPGP Implementation>` might erroneously accept an already {term}`expired<Expiration>` {term}`signature<OpenPGP Signature Packet>`. By marking the {term}`expiration date subpacket` as {term}`critical<Criticality Flag>`, the creator of the {term}`signature<OpenPGP Signature Packet>` ensures that any recipient who cannot process this {term}`subpacket<OpenPGP Signature Subpacket>` will reject the {term}`signature<OpenPGP Signature Packet>` as {term}`invalid<Validation>`.
Consider a scenario where an {term}`implementation<OpenPGP Implementation>` does not recognize a {term}`subpacket<OpenPGP Signature Subpacket>` indicating {term}`signature<OpenPGP Signature Packet>` {term}`expiration`. Without understanding this concept, the {term}`implementation<OpenPGP Implementation>` might erroneously accept an already {term}`expired<Expiration>` {term}`signature<OpenPGP Signature Packet>`. By marking the {term}`signature expiration time subpacket` as {term}`critical<Criticality Flag>`, the creator of the {term}`signature<OpenPGP Signature Packet>` ensures that any recipient who cannot process this {term}`subpacket<OpenPGP Signature Subpacket>` will reject the {term}`signature<OpenPGP Signature Packet>` as {term}`invalid<Validation>`.
For specific guidelines on which {term}`subpackets<OpenPGP Signature Subpacket>` should be marked as {term}`critical<Criticality Flag>`, refer to the {term}`RFC` sections [5.2.3.11](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-signature-creation-time) to [5.2.3.36](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-intended-recipient-fingerpr).