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clarify
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@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ Of the defined revocation types, *Key is superseded*, *Key is retired* and *User
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The distinction between hard and soft revocations plays a role when evaluating the validity of a component or signature at a specified reference time: Hard revocations have unbounded [temporal validity](temporal-validity), they are in effect even before their creation time and therefore invalidate the revoked component or signature at all points in time.
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By contrast, a soft revocation leaves the revoked component or signature valid before the creation time of the revocation signature. A soft revocation can technically be overridden, for example, with a newer binding signature.
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By contrast, a soft revocation leaves the revoked component or signature valid before the creation time of the revocation signature. A soft revocation can technically be overridden, for example, with a newer binding signature (the new binding signature and its metadata then shadow the revocation and re-connect and re-validate the component).
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Hard revocations address the following problem: If a private key was compromised, then the attacker can issue signatures using that key. This means, the attacker could issue a signature dated before the revocation, impersonating the owner of the key. A recipient of that signature would mistakenly consider this signature valid if the issuing key has been soft revoked. This is a problem.
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To counteract this problem, it is reasonable to clearly mark compromised keys as suspect at any point in time. That's what hard revocations do.
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