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todo: merge in flooding text from ch8
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@ -292,17 +292,6 @@ This process assumes that Bob knows the person known as `Alice Adams` and is con
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For more on third-party {term}`certifications<Certification>`, see {ref}`third_party_cert`.
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(cert-flooding)=
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### Security considerations
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While a convenience for consumers, indiscriminately accepting and integrating {term}`third-party identity certifications<Third-party Identity Certification>` comes with significant risks.
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Without any restrictions in place, malicious entities can flood a {term}`certificate<OpenPGP Certificate>` with excessive {term}`certifications<Certification>`. Called "certificate flooding," this form of digital vandalism grossly expands the {term}`certificate<OpenPGP Certificate>` size, making the {term}`certificate<OpenPGP Certificate>` cumbersome and impractical for users.
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It also opens the door to potential denial-of-service attacks, rendering the {term}`certificate<OpenPGP Certificate>` non-functional or significantly impeding its operation.
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The popular [SKS keyserver network experienced certificate flooding firsthand](https://dkg.fifthhorseman.net/blog/openpgp-certificate-flooding.html), causing it to shut down operations in 2019.
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## Advanced topics
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### When are certificates valid?
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@ -522,6 +511,7 @@ Some OpenPGP subsystems may add User IDs to a certificate, which are not bound t
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Sequoia additionally certifies these foreign User IDs with the local trust root to facilitate authentication of certificates but marks all this additional signatures with a Non Exportable subpacket so that they are not visible when publishing the certificate e.g. on keyservers.
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(cert-flooding)=
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### Third-party certification flooding
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While a convenience for consumers, indiscriminately accepting and integrating third-party identity certifications comes with significant risks.
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@ -530,4 +520,10 @@ Without any restrictions in place, malicious entities can flood a certificate wi
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It also opens the door to potential denial-of-service attacks, rendering the certificate non-functional or significantly impeding its operation.
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The popular [SKS keyserver network experienced certificate flooding firsthand](https://dkg.fifthhorseman.net/blog/openpgp-certificate-flooding.html), causing it to shut down operations in 2019.
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The popular [SKS keyserver network experienced certificate flooding firsthand](https://dkg.fifthhorseman.net/blog/openpgp-certificate-flooding.html), causing it to shut down operations in 2019.
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TODO: merge in text from ch8:
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```text
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However, in systems that unconditionally accept these certifications, it can lead to unintended consequences. Specifically, this approach has been exploited to cause denial-of-service attacks through [certificate flooding](https://dkg.fifthhorseman.net/blog/openpgp-certificate-flooding.html), a problem notably experienced by the SKS network of OpenPGP servers.
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```
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