use "OpenPGP subsystem" to talk about certificate store state

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Heiko Schaefer 2023-12-07 22:04:57 +01:00
parent c217ed6ab4
commit c2c7ad63bc
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@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ However, in a different context, the same certificate might be fetched to verify
Disadvantages/risks of minimizing certificates:
- A minimized certificate does not present a full view of how it (and the validity of its components) evolved over time.
- As an OpenPGP instance learns about more certificates, third-party certifications that were previously unusable may become usable. Dropping third-party certifications by unknown issuers as a part of minimization prevents this mechanism.
- As the OpenPGP subsystem on a user's computer learns about more certificates, third-party certifications that were previously unusable may become usable. Dropping third-party certifications by unknown issuers as a part of minimization prevents this mechanism.
- An OpenPGP implementation that minimizes a certificate might remove component keys that it cannot use itself (e.g. because it doesn't support the algorithm of that key), even if the *receiving* implementation supports them.
- Refreshing certificates from key servers may inflate the certificate again, since OpenPGP certificates tend to act as [append-only structures](append-only).
- Some libraries, such as [anonaddy-sequoia](https://gitlab.com/willbrowning/anonaddy-sequoia/-/blob/master/src/sequoia.rs?ref_type=heads#L125) strip unusable encryption subkeys, but retain at least one subkey, even if all subkeys are expired. Although this may leave only an expired encryption subkey in the certificate, this presents a better UX for the end-user who potentially is still in possession of the private key for decryption.